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Quod dubitas, ne feceris – Kant on Using Conscience as a Guide
Jens Timmermann, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of St Andrews
There is a vital feature of Kant’s theory of conscience that interpreters invariably fail to mention. The
reason for this omission is not entirely clear. Some may feel no need to discuss it because they take it
for granted. In all likelihood, however, it is simply overlooked by the majority of those who write on
the topic. In either case, the matter deserves to be clarified in a brief discussion note.
§ 1.
Part IV of Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason contains a brief account of how con-
science can serve as a guide “for moral decisions that demand the most thoughtful consideration” (in
den bedenklichsten moralischen Entschließungen, AA VI 185.16–17).1 Conscience is dubbed “a conscious-
ness that is by itself our duty” (AA VI 185.18–19). As emerges a little further down, what Kant means
by this enigmatic remark is that we must, when we are about to act, be conscious of having a good or
clean conscience.2 The consciousness “that an action that I want to undertake is right [recht] is uncondi-
tionally our duty” (AA IV 185.25–186.1). If we are to any degree uncertain we must refrain from do-
ing it: “It is a moral principle that requires no proof: one ought to venture nothing that runs the danger
that it might be wrong [daß es unrecht sei] (quod dubitas, ne feceris! Pliny)” (AA VI 185.23–25).3 Kant op-
poses this principle of caution to “probabilism” (AA VI 186.7), glossed as the view that holding the
1. All translations used – rather than mentioned – in this paper are my own. 
2. Kant is obviously focusing on conscience is its prospective role. In his late lectures and writings, he
distinguishes between prospective and retrospective conscience, i.e. between conscience before and after the
deed. In its former function, conscience warns us against certain courses of action. In its latter function, it passes
a verdict upon what we have done, which results in either a bad or a clear conscience. The idea – borrowed
from Baumgarten, Ethica, § 181 – that there is a third, ‘concomitant’ kind is to be found in the early lectures on
ethics (e.g. Collins, AA XXVII 356.23). But it is ultimately dismissed on the grounds that there is no room for it
(see Vigilantius, AA XXVII 616.29–35). Before the act, conscience raises questions about proposed courses of
action. After the act, conscience at times condemns what we have done. But both prospective and retrospective
conscience can declare our acts legitimate. What we are about to do can be right; it is possible that we know
what we have done to be permissible. Particularly with a view to the latter we speak of a ‘clear’ or ‘clean’
conscience. This does not as such amount to a positive sense of fulfilment or satisfaction because it satisfies
none of our inclinations (that would conjure up the spectre of eudaimonism). We merely escape a negative
verdict (pangs of conscience). But it may lead to a sense of moral or intellectual contentment (cf. Critique of
Practical Reason AA V 118.1).
3. Pliny, Epistulae I, 18, 5. Kant mentions it in much the same spirit in a note on moral certainty (R 2504,
1790s); in the 1797 Theodicy essay, he calls it the ‘material principle of conscientiousness’ (AA VIII 268.7); and in
Powalski’s moral philosophy notes, probability and certainty are discussed as features of rules (AA XXVII
127.33–128.16). On the context of the quotation see Werner Pluhar’s note (I. Kant, Religion within the Bounds of
Bare Reason, trans. W. Pluhar, Indianapolis, Hackett, 2009, p. 206).
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opinion that an action may well be right is sufficient to make it permissible. He associates probabil-
ism with the teachings of the Jesuits.4
Accordingly, one prominent task of conscience is that of relating abstract and general com-
mands of reason to our own intended actions with a view to their permissibility: 
Whether an action in general is right or wrong [recht oder unrecht] is judged by the under-
standing, not by conscience. And it is not absolutely necessary to know of all possible actions
whether they are right or wrong. But with respect to the action that I want to undertake I
must not only judge, and be of the opinion, but also be certain that it is not wrong [...].” (AA
VI 185.23–186.6)
The idea that there is something fundamentally first-personal about conscience – which cannot be
said of the moral law as such – is borne out by Kant’s casual remarks elsewhere, e.g. in the Ground-
work’s second illustration of the categorical imperative. There the agent, Kant says, “still has enough
conscience to ask himself: is it not impermissible and contrary to duty to help oneself out of need in
such a way?” (to obtain a loan by means of a false promise, AA IV 422.19–20).5 Moreover, conscience
is declared a precondition of all duties in the Doctrine of Virtue (at AA VI 406.34–407.1, cf. AA
VI 400.21–401.21) – the moral law would be nothing to us if it remained wholly detached from our
practical concerns. We learn from Johann Friedrich Vigilantius’ notes on Kant’s lectures on the meta-
physics of morals that, to this end, conscience makes us investigate matters of fact, i.e. we need to as-
certain that our opinion that an act is permissible is actually justified.6 Conscience connects moral
rules with the acting self. It is practical apperception. 
4. We know this from a note jotted down at around the time the book was published (R 2632) and from a
discussion of probabilism in the Vigilantius lecture notes on the metaphysics of morals (XXVII 622.31–36).
Jesuits did indeed defend several different versions of probabilism, including a very permissive version that
required support from one authority (against overwhelming advice from others). The historical manifestations
of probabilism and Kant’s connections with them fall outside the scope of this paper. For a concise overview
see Pluhar, op. cit., p. 206. The Quod dubitas principle is mentioned (and probabilism rejected) very early on:
R 6955 (1770s): “All moral laws must be certain. Subsumptions can be probable. Probabilism with regard to
what is permitted is evil.” Cf. also R 6303 and R 6549, which emphasises the necessity of legal permissibility
(Rechtmäßigkeit). Both date back to the same period. The rejection of probabilism is a constant in Kant’s ethical
thought from (at least) the 1770s. On the moral dangers of probabilism see R 7180 and Collins, AA XXVII
359.19–23. Also, Kant takes issue with Baumgarten’s definition of probabilism (Ethica, § 193) in Vigilantius,
XXVII 622.24–30.
5. So, here conscience speaks up against inclination, not against the teachings of revealed religion. 
6. In Vigilantius, Kant similarly says that the judgement of conscience concerns a factum (a deed? matters of
fact that would, in conjunction with a law, justify a deed?). We have, Vigilantius tells us, a duty to investigate
the latter, called ‘circumstances’ (Umstände), whereas the judgement of the understanding relates to a general
proposition (AA XXVII 614.31–32). Kant probably takes his cue from Baumgarten’s theory of a court or forum,
see Initia, §§ 181–185. 
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§ 2.
Now, the point of clarification that needs to be made explicit is this.7 In its capacity as a guide, con-
science concerns itself solely with the juridical permissibility of a proposed action.8 Kant’s injunction
not to do anything that runs the danger of being ‘wrong’, or always to make sure that what one does
is ‘right’, is not about right and wrong in its general, modern ethical sense, in which it is said to be
wrong not to help someone in need, i.e. to neglect a positive, ethical obligation of beneficence.9 Kant’s
principle of caution does not concern conformity or non-conformity with any kind of obligation that
can be derived from the categorical imperative. Nor does it apply to choosing the right means to the
moral or non-moral – let alone immoral – ends we pursue. Rather, the question raised and investig-
ated by conscience concerns the danger of our violating strict duty, of infringing upon someone’s
rights.10 
7. None of the following authors discusses or even mentions the point: James DiCenso (Kant's “Religion within
the Boundaries of Mere Reason”: A Commentary, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 237–242);
Andrea Esser (“The Inner Court of Conscience, Moral Self-Knowledge, and the Proper Object of Duty (TL
6:437–444)”, in A. Trampota, O. Sensen and J. Timmermann (edd.), Kant's “Tugendlehre”: A Comprehensive
Commentary, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2013, pp. 269–292); Katrin Flikschuh (“Gottesdienst als Afterdienst: Die Kirche
als öffentliche Institution bei Kant”, in O. Höffe (ed.) Immanuel Kant: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen
Vernunft, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2010, pp. 193–210, especially pp. 207–209); Dean Moyar (“Unstable
Autonomy: Conscience and Judgment in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, Journal of Moral Philosophy 5, 2008, pp. 327–
360); Stephen Palmquist (Comprehensive Commentary on Kant's Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason,
Chichester, Wiley Blackwell, 2015, pp. 464–476); Lawrence Pasternack (Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, London and New York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 230–232); Dieter
Schönecker and Elke Schmidt (“Kants Philosophie des Gewissens – Skizze für eine kommentarische
Interpretation”, in M. Egger (ed.), Philosophie Nach Kant: Neue Wege Zum Verständnis von Kants Transzendental-
Und Moralphilosophie, Berlin and Boston, De Gruyter, 2014, pp. 279–312); Allen W. Wood (Kantian Ethics,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 182–192). Regrettably, my own earlier discussion of
conscience is no exception (J. Timmermann, “Kant on Conscience, ‘Indirect’ Duty, and Moral Error’,
International Philosophical Quarterly 46, 2006, pp. 293–308). The point will not have eluded some of these
interpreters, particularly those who work with the German text; but the fact remains that it is never explicitly
stated. Speaking of ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ – rather than ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ – actions, G. Felicitas Munzel comes
closest to putting her finger on it (Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The "Critical" Link of Morality,
Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999, p. 221, and “What Does His
Religion Contribute to Kant’s Conception of Practical Reason?”, in G. E. Michalson (ed.), Kant’s “Religion within
the Boundaries of Mere Reason”: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 214–232,
especially pp. 230–232). But she does not explain her choice of words.  
8. Similarly, Vigilantius tells us to ascertain the legality (Rechtmäßigkeit) of an action, cf. AA XXVII 616.7. 
9. The restricted scope of conscience is much clearer in the original than in (English) translation. The words
rendered ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ by both Werner Pluhar and George di Giovanni are recht and unrecht, not richtig
and falsch. It does not help that di Giovanni removes the double negation at at AA VI 186.6: “With respect to the
action that I want to undertake, however, I must not only judge, and be of the opinion, that it is right [daß sie
nicht unrecht sei]; I must also be certain that it is.” (I. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, trans. A. W. Wood
and G. Di Giovanni, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 203).
10. Kant’s examples tend to focus on strict, juridical duties to others: not to destroy innocent life, not to deprive
them of what is theirs etc. Is the voice of conscience silent when one is about to violate laws of strict duty to
oneself? Moreover, it is worth remembering that it is a matter of strict duty to adopt the ends of others as one’s
own, i.e. it is impermissible (wrong) not to adopt a maxim of helpfulness. (This is a duty antecedent to and
distinct from any particular obligation to help.) If so, conscience may well, indirectly, have something to say
about imperfect obligations after all. 
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This restriction of the scope of conscience tallies with the metaphor of conscience as a court of
law.11 What is more, both illustrations mentioned by Kant himself concern strict duties of right. Abra-
ham12 and the inquisitor13 would wrong someone (violate someone’s rights) were they to kill a hu-
man being on the basis of their faith. In Kant’s mind, the prohibitions of strict duty are so clear that
no evidence can be made to bear against them.14 This is something the voice of conscience can teach
us, if only we are prepared to listen. There can be no doubt that it is impermissible to take the life of
an innocent person. Whenever we explore the question whether killing an innocent human being is
permissible some suspicion will remain.15 Neither historical16 nor direct revelation can ever establish
beyond reasonable doubt that it would right to do so. Conscience will not fall silent.17 
§ 3.
It clearly makes a huge difference whether ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are taken in the wide or in the narrow
sense of these words. With the restriction of scope in place, Kant’s thesis that we should let con-
science be the guide to serious moral questions rests on two assumptions that, though expressions of
Enlightenment optimism, are not wholly unreasonable. The first is that we know whether we have
examined the question of permissibility to our own, subjective satisfaction. The second assumption –
by now familiar – is that in some cases we never will, i.e. that there will, in those cases, always be
lingering doubts as to whether an action is ‘right’ in the juridical sense. There are three possible res-
ults. Either we come to the wholehearted conclusion that an action is permissible, i.e. that it does not
11. This includes strict duties to others that cannot be enforced, e.g. questions of equity, which Kant explicitly
refers to the ‘court of conscience’ (AA VI 235.9). Accordingly, violations of the demands of equity result in a
bad or guilty conscience.
12. Abraham was told by God that he should slaughter his son Isaac like a lamb, AA VI 187.4–10; cf. Genesis
22, 1–2.
13. The inquisitor faces the question whether he is allowed to condemn a heretic to death, AA VI 186.23. He is
named as Thomas of Torquemada, the first Grand Inquisitor of the Spanish Inquisition, in Vigilantius’ lecture
notes (cf. AA XXVII 615.28).
14. The plausibility of the idea that conscience can serve as a guide may depend on the negative character of
laws of perfect duty, which are not supposed to conflict with each other (cf. J. Timmermann, “Kantian
Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant's Ethical Theory”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95, 2013, pp. 36–64).
15. Isaac is clearly innocent; and the inquisitor finds fault with the heretic on religious grounds. The latter has
not broken the just laws of the sate, he is a “good citizen” (AA VI 186.23–24). Otherwise he might, in Kant’s
view, deserve to die, though it seems questionable that it would be right for the inquisitor, in that capacity, to
convict and sentence him. Of course, an actual judge or a jury might well be in doubt as to whether someone
accused of a capital offence is actually guilty. It follows from Kant’s principle that they have to return a verdict
of ‘not proven’ (where this option exists) or ‘not guilty’.     
16. The conscientious examination of all relevant facts can never substantiate the position of Roman
Catholicism in the late fifteenth century, that someone should be put to death on account of his heretical beliefs.
Revelation is uncertain, as are human exegetical endeavours. By contrast, the principle that no innocent person
must be put to death is apodictically certain.
17. In keeping with the target of probabilism, the guiding role of conscience concerns practical conflicts
between church doctrine, which is based on the interpretation of historical documents, and the morality of pure
reason. But Kant himself extends it to an imaginary case of a conflict of morality with direct revelation (the case
of Abraham and Isaac). The guiding capacity of conscience appears to be perfectly general. It can be used to test
action based on any kind of conviction, authority, ideology or personal inclination that can clash with the
commands of the categorical imperative.
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violate the rights of the person affected; or we reach the wholehearted conclusion that the action is
impermissible; or we do not reach a wholehearted conclusion, i.e. we may have a firm belief, or come
to a conclusion, but doubts will linger. We must refrain from the act in the third case, as in the
second. And we can be aware of this, no matter whether my understanding, relying on Church or
positive law, comes to a different conclusion (a conclusion that is still exposed to doubt). It is this cer-
tainty in matters of strict duty (to others) that allows Kant to say that the Doctrine of Right does not
need either casuistry or a doctrine of method (see AA VI 411.2–9).  
Without this restriction, the principle not to do anything that might be wrong (or not right) is
totally unconvincing. We would be paralysed by doubt. How could we ever be allowed to do any-
thing? Take, first, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in the general ethical sense, which comprises actions in accord-
ance with or contrary to any kind of duty. According to the Groundwork, it is our duty to be benefi-
cent where we can (IV 398.8). But the needs of others constitute many, often conflicting claims.
Ethical training is needed to help us decide. There are rules of thumb to the effect that urgent cases,
those who are near and dear etc. should be given priority, but it is difficult to see how our opinion
that we ought to help a particular person can ever be free from lingering doubts. 
Things get even worse if we include the instrumentalist sense of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Assume
that, in some specific case, we come to the wholehearted moral judgement that we ought to rescue a
person in need, say a friend of ours who is drowning. This is the right thing to do. This does not
mean that we are clear about the means needed to save the friend. We may well be uncertain as to
whether we should call the coast guard, inform an Olympic swimmer who is now our colleague or
quickly jump in to rescue the friend ourselves. The principle of quod dubitas, ne feceris would condemn
us to inaction, which cannot be right.18 
In sum, the significance of the use of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in Kant’s theory of conscience ex-
tends far beyond textual fidelity. The philosophical plausibility of the idea that conscience can serve
as a guide stands and falls with it.19
18. In an early note (R 2462, dating from the 1770s), Kant seems to suggest that different degrees of certainty
apply to different practical spheres. Mere belief can – and in many cases must – be the basis for prudential
action, but it does not suffice to settle cases of juridical doubt.
19. This short paper is based on my comments on Claudio La Rocca’s Mary Gregor Lecture “Kant and the
Problem of Conscience”, read at the meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association
in Chicago on 3 March 2016 and now published in Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy, vol. I (2016), 65–
79. I am indebted to Pablo Muchnik for his invitation to undertake this task. I should also like to thank Yoon
Choi, Jeanine Grenberg, Claudio La Rocca and my wife, Kate Moran, for comments on an earlier version of this
paper.
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